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Notes
TRADE NAME FILING: SHOULD IT BE
SUFFICIENT TO PERFECT A SECURITY
INTEREST UNDER U.C.C. SECTION 9-402?*
One way a secured party may perfect his security interest under the Uniform
Commercial Code is to file a financing statement under the debtor's name. Though
many debtors use trade as well as legal names, the Code has failed to make clear
whether a filing under the debtor's trade name alone is sufficient to perfect a security
interest. This Note discusses the accepted per se and ad hoc analyses as well as the
more recent 'flexible" approach to this problem. The author concludes that though a
limited 'flexible" approach is workable, the best solution is to amend section 9-402 to
require the filing of the debtor's legal name explicitly.
INTRODUCTION
BEFORE THE ENACTMENT of article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (UCC or Code), the law governing secured trans-
actions consisted of a variety of complex,' irregular,' and unclear 3
security devices. The drafters of article 9 sought to develop a "sim-
ple and unified structure" to enable creditors to create security in-
* First prize, Commercial Law Foundation Competition, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (sponsored by the Commercial Law Foundation).
1. See U.C.C. § 9-101 comment (1977).
The recognition of so many separate security devices had the result that half a
dozen filing systems covering chattel security devices might be maintained within a
state, some on a county basis, others on a state-wide basis, each of which had to be
separately checked to determine a debtor's status.
Id.
2. See id.
[Ain unfiled chattel mortgage was by the law of many states 'void' against creditors
generally; a conditional sale, often available as a substitute for the chattel mortgage,
was in some states valid against all creditors without filing, and in states where filing
is required was, if unfiled, void only against lien creditors.
Id.
3. See id.
It was often baffling to try to maintain a technically valid security interest when
financing a manufacturing process, where the collateral starts out as raw materials,
becomes work in process and ends as finished goods. Furthermore, it was by no
means clear, even to specialists, how under pre-Code law a security interest might
be taken in many kinds of intangible property-such as television or motion picture
rights--which have come to be an important source of commercial collateral.
Id.
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terests4 with greater certainty and lower cost than was possible
under the pre-Code laws.5 Yet, secured creditors6 still confront dif-
ficulties under article 9, as illustrated by the controversy surround-
ing the correct filing of the debtor's name in a financing statement.
Filing a financing statement is one means7 by which a secured
party can perfect his security interest.8 Perfection is intended to
provide third parties with notice of prior security interests in the
collateral.9 By providing this notice, the secured creditor's interests
in the collateral will generally be superior to the interests of third
parties.,o
The drafters of the UCC intended to create a filing process that
requires minimal formalities1 but provides adequate notice to third
parties.' 2 Section 9-402 of the Code defines the elements of an effec-
tive financing statement. 3 While the drafters considered it to be a
radical improvement over the pre-Code law, section 9-402 gener-
ated enough controversy to be revised substantially in the Code's
1972 amendments.
14
Section 9-402's failure to instruct secured parties whether to file
their financing statements under the debtor's legal name, trade
name, or both particularly troubled the courts. 15 Without such in-
struction a subsequent creditor wishing to ascertain whether a se-
curity interest in his debtor's collateral existed had no idea how to
conduct an effective search.
4. Id. § 1-201(37) defines "security interest" as "an interest in personal property or
fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
5. Id. § 9-101 comment.
6. Id. § 9-105(1)(m) defines a secured party as "a lender, seller, or other person in
whose favor there is a security interest."
7. The secured party may also perfect his interest through possession. Id. § 9-
302(1)(a).
8. A critical reading of U.C.C. § 9-303(1) and comment 1 discloses that perfection does
not guarantee the secured party's superior rights in every case. As one commentator suc-
cinctly noted, "Perfection through possession or filing does not assure the financer of victory;
it merely keeps him in the contest." IA P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, D. VAGTS & J. McDON-
NELL, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 6C.01[2], at
6C-10 (1984) [hereinafter cited as P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN].
9. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302, -304 to -306. See generally IA P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN,
supra note 8, § 6C.01[1]-[4], at 6C-4 to -15 (discussing notice under the UCC); Baird &
Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 175, 179-96 (1983) (discussing problems of separating ownership from possession).
10. See U.C.C. § 9-301.
11. Id. § 9-101 comment.
12. Id. § 9-402 comment 2.
13. See U.C.C. § 9-402; see also U.C.C. § 9-402 (1962) (amended 1972).
14. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
15. See U.C.C. § 9-402 (1962) (amended 1972).
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In the 1972 revision of the UCC'6 the drafters added a provision
declaring a financing statement "sufficient" if it listed the debtor's
legal name, among other things. 17  Courts disagree, however,
whether the revision requires the listing of the debtor's legal name,
or whether the listing of his trade name is allowable. Some courts
have ruled that section 9-402 implicitly requires the debtor's legal
name in the financing statement.1 8 Other courts have validated fi-
nancing statements not providing the debtor's legal name where
there has been sufficient information to alert searchers about possi-
ble prior security interests.' 9 In a recent case, National Bank v.
West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), ° the court devel-
oped a flexible approach that found a middle ground between these
two approaches. 2 ' This Note analyzes the various judicial re-
sponses to the confusion surrounding the filing of the debtor's
name.2 2 The Note suggests that although the McBee flexible ap-
proach is workable,23 a better solution to the problem is to amend
16. The 1972 version of U.C.C. § 9-402 is in effect (with limited modifications depend-
ing on the jurisdiction) in 41 states and the District of Columbia. See ALA. CODE § 7-9-402
(Supp. 1983); ALASKA STAT. §-45.09.402 (Supp. 1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3141
(Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-402 (Supp. 1983); CAL. COM. CODE § 9402 (West
Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-402 (West Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28:9-402 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.402 (West Supp. 1983); GA. CODE § 11-9-
402 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490:9-402 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 28-9-402 (1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 9-402 (Smith-Hurd 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9402 (West
Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-402 (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-402
(Supp. 1983); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 9-402 (Supp. 1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 106, § 9-402 (West Supp. 1983); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9402 (West Supp.
1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-402 (West Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-402
(1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-402 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-402 (1980); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 104.9402 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-402 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:9-402 (West Supp. 1983); N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-402 (McKinney Supp. 1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-9-402 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-41 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1309.39 (Page Supp. 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-402 (West Supp. 1983);
OR. REV. STAT. § 79.4020 (1981); 13 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 9402 (Purdon Supp. 1983);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-402 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-9-402 (Supp.
1984); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402 (Vernon Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 70A-9-402 (1980); VA. CODE § 8.9-402 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-
402 (Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE § 46-9-402 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 409.402 (West
Supp. 1983); WYO. STAT. § 34-21-951 (Supp. 1984).
17. U.C.C. § 9-402(1).
18. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that the
1972 amendments explicitly require the debtor's legal name. IA P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN,
supra note 8, § 6C.05[2], at 6C-46.
19. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
20. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
21. See infra notes 112-125 and accompanying text.
22. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
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the Code to make clear that the financing statement must contain
the debtor's legal name to be valid.24
I. NOTICE FILING UNDER SECTION 9-402
Section 9-402 draws heavily from the "notice filing" approach of
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act.25 The UCC's drafters sought to
create "[a] more rational filing system ' 26 by attempting to keep for-
mal requisites at a minimum 27 but still provide adequate notice to
subsequent creditors.28 The drafters struck a balance which places
minimal formal burdens on the secured party29 but provides a seri-
ous penalty for noncompliance: failure of perfection.30 The courts,
however, will ultimately decide the weight of the secured party's
burden, since the Code merely requires "substantial compliance"
with the filing requirements.31
Even if the secured party files a fatally defective financing state-
ment, his rights are unlikely to be prejudiced;32 in most instances
the debtor remains solvent and fulfills the obligation.33  But if the
24. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
25. U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2. "What is required to be filed is not ... the security
agreement itself, but only a simple notice which may be filed before the security interest
attaches or thereafter. The notice itself indicates merely that the secured party who has filed
may have a security interest in the collateral." Id. See Coogan, Public Notice Under the
Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security Laws, Including "Notice Fil-
ing," 47 IOWA L. REV. 289, 311-19 (1962), reprinted in IA:P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra
note 8, §§ 6.01, 6.03-.04, at 461, 487-96.
26. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.
27. See Coogan, supra note 25, at 291 (§ 9-402 financing statement "may be considered
under traditional standards as giving only skeletal information"), reprinted in lA P. COOGAN
& W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 6.0113], at 464.
28. National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316,
1321 (5th Cir. 1983); Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 795 (5th
Cir. 1981). See also 1A P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 6C.03, at 6C-31 to-35
(identifying "privacy," "disclosure," and "facilitation" as the interests to be considered).
29. See U.C.C. § 9-402.
30. See, e.g., Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785,
787-88 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. U.C.C. § 9-402(8) ("A financing statement substantially complying with the require-
ments of this section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously
misleading.").
32. See id. § 9-301 (persons with priority over unperfected security interests).
33.
[P]erfection is required only to give full validity to the security interest against third
parties. It is not required between the secured party and the debtor himself. So
long as the security interest has been properly obtained ('attached to use Article 9
terminology'), then the secured party can enforce it against the debtor whether or
not the steps to perfect the security interest have been taken.
Shanker, The General Secured Transactions Law Under Article 9 of the American Uniform
Commercial Code and the British Crowther Report (Part 5), in SECURITY OVER CORPORAL
[Vol. 35:51
TRADE NAME FILING
debtor becomes insolvent-the very risk from which the secured
party wants protection 34 -the secured party should anticipate a
hostile reception to his claim in the debtor's bankruptcy
proceeding. 35
In most cases, the secured party could have avoided failure of
perfection if he had merely read the filing rules.36 Although some
version of the Code has been in force in nearly every state for at
least fifteen years,37 some people apparently are still unaware of its
filing requirements.
A. The Operation of a Notice System
If a searcher 38 wishes to determine whether a security interest in
certain collateral exists, he checks the index of financing statements
in his jurisdiction's record office. The Code directs the filing officer
of the jurisdiction to arrange the financing statements alphabetically
by the name of the debtor indicated on the particular statement.39
The searcher then looks under the debtor's name to determine
whether there is a security interest in the collateral.
Though the procedure seems simple, the searcher may have dif-
MOVEABLES 49 (J. Sauveplanne ed. 1974); 1 P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 1.04,
at 1-20 (only slight chance that secured party will need to assert his security interest in a
bankruptcy proceeding). See also U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -505 (secured party's rights when
debtor defaults).
34. The bankruptcy code may render unenforceable even properly perfected security
interests. See generally Coogan, The New Bankruptcy Code: The Death of a Security Inter-
est?, 14 GA. L. REV. 153 (1980).
35.
The secured creditor now steps into this unhappy situation and demands that he be
paid in full or that the security he bargained for be turned over to him, regardless of
how many others go unpaid. Unsecured creditors [and other secured creditors with
apparently lower priority] who look forward to the prospect of getting less than ten
cents on the dollar will not take kindly to the idea that one of the creditors is going
to get one hundred cents or something near it. At this point, their representative
* * ' begins his diligent search for one or more flaws in the title of the secured party,
and in a surprising number of cases, he is successful.
I P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 1.04, at 1-18. The bankruptcy trustee's incentive
for discovering errors is found in § 9-301, which gives lien creditors priority over unperfected
security interests. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b), (3).
36. 1 P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 3AA.12[14], at 3AA-28.
37. See supra note 16.
38. "Searcher" is used in this Note to mean a subsequent creditor.
39. U.C.C. § 9-403(4). The 1972 version of the Code also provides that the secured
party may, at his own option, index the debtor's trade names. Id. § 9-403(5). The additional
notice provided by this cross-index benefits secured parties by minimizing the number of
challenges to the financing statement. While this option creates an additional expense, it is
less expensive than requiring creditors to file a separate financing statement for every trade
name. Id. § 9-403(5); 2 R. ALDERMAN & R. DOLE, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 891, 969 n.417 (2d ed. 1983).
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ficulty finding the name. If the name given on the financing state-
ment differs from that known to the searcher, he may not discover
the security interest. Furthermore, the secured party could list the
debtor's name in one of four incorrect ways. First, the secured
party might have misstated the name. A searcher looking for "Ex-
cel Department Stores" might miss a financing statement listed
under "Excel Stores, Inc."'  Second, the secured party might have
listed a trade name similar to the debtor's legal name. A searcher
looking for "Henry Platt" might miss a financing statement listed
under the debtor's trade name, "Platt Fur Co."'" Third, the se-
cured party might have listed a trade name entirely different from
the debtor's legal name. A searcher looking for "Cynthia McBee"
or "Joe Ben Colley" would certainly miss a financing statement
listed under the debtor's trade name, "Oak Hill Gun Shop," with-
out further information.42 Fourth, the secured party might have
misspelled the name. A searcher looking for "Tri-State Molded
Plastics, Inc." might miss "Tri-State Moulded Plastics, Inc." '4 3 To
avoid these problems, the searcher should look for as many varia-
tions of the debtor's name as possible.
The searcher's task is further complicated by the practical limi-
tations on his ability to make a thorough search. He may never see
the file since a significant portion of searches are conducted by mail
or telephone.' Even if the searcher were willing to visit the records
office, the state may deny him access to the files. 5
The advent of computer-stored files may also frustrate a
searcher's effort to discover the existence of a security interest. If a
searcher misstates even a single letter in the debtor's name, he may
fail to retrieve a financing statement from the computer.46
40. See In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1965). The prior creditor may
also have misspelled the debtor's name. See infra note 46.
41. See In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
42. See National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d
1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
43. See Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. (In re Tyler), 23
Bankr. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
44. 2 R. ALDERMAN & R. DOLE, supra note 39, at 1004.
45. Such states will conduct a search only if the searcher submits a written request. See
In re Lintz W. Side Lumber, 655 F.2d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 1981) (omission of debtor's legal
name found seriously misleading because government official searched records). But cf. In re
Reeco Elec. Co., 415 F. Supp. 238, 241-42 (D. Me. 1976) (questioning whether such state
procedures are consistent with Code's "public inspection" language).
46. See Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. (In re Tyler), 23
Bankr. 806, 809-10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (change in debtor's name from "Tri-State
Moulded Plastics, Inc." to "Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc." was seriously misleading since
computer index would treat them as different); see also IA P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra
[Vol. 35:51
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The drafters of section 9-402 intended to simplify the filing pro-
cedure. However, carelessly filed financing statements, practical
limitations, and the lack of instruction in the section itself have
complicated the process. The complexity of the search and uncer-
tainty of its results undermine the drafters' intent.47
B. Judicial Response to the 1962 Code's Failure to Require the
Debtor's Name
The Code drafters should have written section 9-402 to require
the debtor's legal name on a financing statement. Since they did
not,48 the responsibility fell on the courts to determine whether a
financing statement needed the debtor's name to be sufficient. Two
judicial responses evolved. 49 Under a per se approach, courts inval-
idated financing statements that omitted the debtor's legal name.5 0
Under an ad hoc approach, other courts used a notice analysis and
validated financing statements if they contained sufficient informa-
tion to put subsequent creditors on notice of the security interest.51
Most courts followed the per se approach, and read a require-
ment for the inclusion of the debtor's name into section 9-402(1).52
Any financing statement containing only the debtor's trade name
was invalidated. 3
note 8, § 6C.05[2] at 6C-55, n.149 (quoting Shapiro, Filing, in 3 CALIFORNIA COMMERCIAL
LAW §§ 5.10, 5.80, 5.81 (Rosenblatt ed. 1966)). "[E]iectronic processing would treat the
following names differently:
TV Sales Company
T V Sales Company
T.V. Sales Company
T-V Sales Company
Tee Vee Sales Company
Television Sales Company
Tele-vision Sales Company."
Id.
47. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
48. "A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor. ... U.C.C. § 9-
402(1) (1962) (amended 1972). The drafters of the 1972 revision added the phrase "gives the
names of the debtor and the secured party," between the words "it" and "is." See U.C.C.
§ 9-402(1) (1977).
49. See infra notes 52-66 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., In re Levins, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1076, 1080-82 (Bankr. E.D.
N.Y. 1970); Bank of Mississippi v. Pongetti (In re Hill), 363 F. Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 1973); In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369, 371-72 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1973); In re
Eichler, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1400, 1402-05 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1971).
53. See supra note 52. But see In re Bengston, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 283, 287
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1965) (Court relied on the lack of requirement for the debtor's name in § 9-
402(1) to uphold a financing statement listing only the debtor's trade name).
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The courts' justification for the per se approach melded two
Code policies: notice54 and liberal construction of its provisions.5
The Code drafters suggested that financing statements need only
include minimal information to put a subsequent creditor on no-
tice.56 They also expressly recognized in section 9-402(8) that a fi-
nancing statement "substantially compl[ying] with the requirements
of [section 9-402] is effective even though it contains minor errors
which are not seriously misleading."57 The courts read the notice
provision as a limitation on section 9-402(8). If the error in filing
was significant enough to prevent the subsequent creditor from find-
ing the financing statement, the security interest was unperfected.5 8
As the court in Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re
Leichter) commented, "would a subsequent creditor looking under
'Leichter' [the debtor's legal name] be led to find the security inter-
est filed and indexed under 'Landman' [the debtor's trade name]?
We think not . . .,.
The more lenient ad hoc view developed concurrently with the
per se approach. Some courts were willing to recognize questiona-
ble financing statements as long as they included sufficient informa-
tion to put searchers on notice of the security interest." These
courts would compare the inaccurate name with the debtor's legal
name.61 If a reasonable searcher would have discovered the inaccu-
rate name, the searcher would be put on inquiry notice.62
The court in Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.)63
used the ad hoc approach to recognize a financing statement in
54. U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2; see also Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re
Leichter), 471 F.2d 785, 787 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Bengston, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
283 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1965).
55. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
56. See authorities cited supra note 54.
57. U.C.C. § 9-402(5) (1962) (amended 1972), accord U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1977).
58. See Northern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d at 787. See
also Arra v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re James Wells Enterprises, Inc.), 21 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 900 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1977); In re Wishart, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1296 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1972).
59. In re Leichter, 471 F.2d at 787. Section 9-403(4) is also used to justify the per se
approach. That section requires the filing officer to index financing statements according to
the debtor's name. Consequently, that section read together with § 9-402 implies the inclu-
sion of the debtor's name in the financing statement. See U.C.C. §§ 9-402, -403(4).
60. E.g., In re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1965); In re Gustafson,
14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 231, 236 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1973); Siljeg v. National Bank
of Commerce, 509 F.2d 1009, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. Sileg, 509 F.2d at 1012.
62. IA P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 6C.05[2], at 6C-42. See also supra
notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
63. 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981).
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which the inaccurate name was radically different from the debtor's
legal name. The financing statement listed "Elite Boats, Division of
Glasco, Inc.," as the debtor, instead of "Glasco, Inc.," the corpora-
tion's legal name. 4 The court justified its decision on a local noto-
riety principle. Since the debtor was known in the community by
the inaccurate name, subsequent creditors could not have been mis-
led.6" The court felt that "reasonably prudent creditors" would
have searched under both the inaccurate name and the debtor's
legal name.66
C. An Attempt to Incorporate a Per Se Approach Into the 1972
Code Amendments
The divergent judicial solutions to the treatment of the debtor's
name seemed to violate the Code drafters' goal of a "simple and
unified structure."67 The 1972 revision of section 9-402, now in ef-
fect, did not completely resolve the problem, however. The section
reads, "A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the
debtor and the secured party .... ,6' A new subsection defines
the type of name intended: "A financing statement sufficiently
shows the name of the debtor if it gives the individual, partnership
or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds other trade
names or the names of partners. ' 69 Comment 7 to section 9-402
indicates that the drafters thought trade names were "too uncertain
and too likely not to be known to the secured party or person
searching the record, to form the basis for a filing system." 70
The drafters of the 1972 amendments, by their use of the ambig-
uous word "sufficient," may have failed to make the requirement of
the debtor's legal name absolute. 71 Section 9-402 says "only that
64. Id. at 796.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. U.C.C. § 9-101 comment.
68. Id. § 9-402(1).
69. Id. § 9-402(7).
70. Id. comment 7.
71. The authors of the 1972 amendment to § 9-402 may have disapproved of Califor-
nia's nonuniform version of the section. This possibility may be inferred from the comments
made by William Burke during a panel discussion at the 1977 annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. See 1 P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 3AA.1215]-[7], at
3AA-21 to -23.
The California provision formerly required the financing statement to set forth the
debtor's legal name and his "trade name or style." CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West 1964)
(amended by CAL. COM. CODE § 9402(1) (West Supp. 1984)). Courts interpreted the provi-
sion strictly and found that correct listing of the debtor's name but omission or incorrect
listing of the trade name rendered a financing statement insufficient. National Cash Register
19841
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filings in the actual individual or partnership name are sufficient,
not that such filings are 'necessary and sufficient.' "72 Had the
drafters intended a per se rule, they should have stated that the
debtor's legal name was necessary to perfect a security interest.
Comment 7 asserts that trade names are "too uncertain and too
likely not to be known."' 73 This strong language is not, however,
the law.74
It seems apparent that the Code drafters could have created a
per se rule.75 The Alabama version of the Code contains an abso-
lute requirement: "The name of the debtor in the financing state-
ment shall be the individual, partnership or corporate name of the
debtor, regardless of trade names or the name of partners. "76
Thus, the Code drafters and the courts have failed to create a
consistent rule for the filing of a debtor's name. Basic policies argue
in favor of invalidating financing statements that erroneously state
the debtor's name. It is unclear, however, whether these policies
demand per se invalidation or whether the ad hoc approach can be
adapted to accommodate them. An analysis of the two approaches
follows.
D. Contrasting the Per Se and Ad Hoc Approaches
1. Uniformity
One of the Code's underlying purposes is to "make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions., 77 The per se rule would ad-
vance that goal. For instance, if two states adopt identical Code
provisions, a secured party who files an inaccurate financing state-
ment should not receive greater rights in one state than he would
receive in the other because of different interpretations of the
Co. v. Danning (In re Thrift Shoe Co., Inc.), 502 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1974). The drafters
rejected the California statute by indicating that the debtor's individual, partnership, or cor-
porate name is sufficient, regardless of whether trade names are added. See U.C.C. § 9-
402(7).
The California legislature has since repealed the 1962 version. See CAL. COM. CODE
§ 9402(1) (West Supp. 1984).
72. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-16, at 959 (2d ed.
1980).
73. U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 7.
74. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.) 642 F.2d 793, 797 n.1 (5th Cir.
1981) (Tuttle, J., dissenting).
75. See supra note 71.
76. ALA. CODE § 7-9-402 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added). The Alabama Code does not
tolerate "minor errors," however. See id. and comment. This deviation detracts from the
force of the per se rule.
77. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c).
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debtor's name requirement.78
The ad hoc approach permits different results based on similar
facts. The per se approach, however, avoids potential inconsisten-
cies among jurisdictions. The courts have merely sidestepped diffi-
cult inquiries as to the searcher's diligence in determining whether a
prior security interest exists. 79 The courts have invalidated financ-
ing statements upon finding the debtors' legal names missing.
It is questionable, however, whether the drafters of the Code
intended blind uniformity to replace careful legal reasoning.80 Uni-
form acceptance of the per se approach should be based upon the
strength of its rationale, not upon the undifferentiated desire for
uniformity.
2. Unduly Burdening the Searcher
The per se approach requires only a simple search for the
debtor's legal name.8' In contrast, the ad hoc approach requires the
searcher to check not only the debtor's legal name but also any
prior or similar names and trade names as well.8"
Ad hoc jurisdictions must address the wisdom of placing these
burdens on the party searching the files, especially since the secured
party is initially required to make sure that the financing statement
is not misleading.83 A searcher will not know how many variations
of the debtor's name to check to be reasonably safe. A subsequent
creditor cannot be sure that a court will find a financing statement
misleading; if he is not certain that he has searched for all possible
variations of the debtor's name, the safest course may be for him to
deny the debtor credit.
78. See In re Osbom, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 227, 232-33 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1969).
79. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
80.
Uniform interpretation and application of the Code promotes the general welfare by
simplifying interstate business activity. Generally speaking, [a state's] courts should
apply the Code as it is applied in other jurisdictions and should avoid disharmoni-
ous interpretations. However, such reasoning when carried to the extreme would
result in [that state] being consistently wrong simply for the sake of consistency, an
obviously intolerable result.
Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 604 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.
1979).
81. See Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Tri-State Molded Plastics, Inc. (In re Tyler), 23
Bankr. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
82. Note, The Effect of Errors and Changes in the Debtor's Name on Article 9 Security
Interests, 1975 DUKE L.J. 148, 162 (1975).
83. Maremont Marketing, Inc. v. Centennial Indus. Inc. (In re Centennial Indus.), 3
Bankr. 416, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Opponents of the ad hoc approach are especially critical of trade
name filings. Since these names can be changed often, to permit
their filing would increase the burden on searchers, who would be
required to search for and discover the debtor's previous trade
names. 
84
Moreover, the ad hoc approach assumes that a searcher will be
alerted and prompted to investigate further if his search discovers
only a minimal record.85 Under this analysis, a reasonably prudent
searcher86 must check and discover all subtle variations of the
debtor's name. 7
The scope of the search under the ad hoc approach could be
limited to inaccuracies resembling the debtor's legal name, or to sit-
uations where the debtor's name is fairly unusual. 88 Thus, a financ-
ing statement covering property of Burley Haley Thomas which
only lists Thomas' trade name, "West Coast Avionics," would be
insufficient,89 but a financing statement for Henry Platt listing
"Platt Fur Co." as the debtor would be validated. 9' Although both
financing statements are equally defective, the secured party's rights
will depend upon the similarities between the debtors' trade name
and his legal name.
Although it is unduly burdensome to require searchers to check
a myriad of trade names, 9' there are instances in which trade name
filing eases the search. If a business usually identifies itself by a
single trade name, that name may be the only one which the
84. "There is no limit to the number of assumed names that can be obtained. Some
businessmen have a propensity for assumed names and may use a different one for each phase
of their activities, adding and discarding as suits their desires." In re Osborn, 6 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 227, 232 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1969).
85. See McMillin v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Fowler) 407 F. Supp. 799, 802
(W.D. Okla. 1975). "These assumptions place a heavy burden on prospective creditors
although the Code contemplates that those seeking to perfect security interests bear the bur-
den of properly filing. Burden shifting of this sort is for the legislature, not the courts."
Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Ga. 1979).
86. See, e.g., Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th
Cir. 1981).
87. See IA P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 6C.05[2], at 6C-51 to -52.
88. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 72, § 23.16, at 958.
89. Van Dusen Acceptance Co. v. Gough (In re Thomas), 466 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972).
90. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478, 482 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
91. The ad hoc approach may be inconsistent with the way searchers conduct their in-
vestigation of the files. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. See also In re Mount, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 653, 655 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1968) (courts should consider
"commercial reasonableness when construing 'minor errors' "). A searcher would be well
advised to conduct his investigation personally, or to prepare a multitude of variable search
requests, instead of relying on telephone or mail inquiries. This complicated procedure
hardly represents the Code's goal of simplification. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a).
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searcher knows. Therefore, the searcher must make an additional
inquiry to discover the debtor's legal name.92 This "only name
known as" approach has its own limitations, which arise from the
debtor's dual identity. While business creditors might not be misled
by a trade name filing, personal creditors probably would be.93
3. The Problem of Careless Filing
The per se approach punishes a secured party who, through
carelessness, fails to file correctly. Conversely, the ad hoc approach
may encourage careless filing. Arguably, the language of section 9-
402(8) supports the ad hoc approach by allowing financing state-
ments that only substantially comply with the filing requirements. 94
Critics point out that the minimum Code requirements must be met
before the liberal construction and substantial compliance provi-
sions can be invoked.95 They contend that the courts use these pro-
visions to eliminate all formal requirements,96 and therefore
promote careless preparation of financing statements.97
The rationale for this argument is that, although the drafters
sought to simplify the formalities surrounding secured transactions,
they did not intend to eliminate them entirely. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to see how upholding an erroneous financing statement will
encourage the secured party to be careless. A defective financing
statement creates major problems for the secured creditor in most
jurisdictions; the secured party would probably not consciously
jeopardize his secured interest98 by ignoring the suggested
92. 4 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402:31, at 501 (2d ed. 1971).
93. Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1981).
See also Citizens Bank v. Sportswear Shoppe, Ltd. (In re Sportswear Shoppe), 15 Bankr. 970,
975 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). The "only name known as" approach is unavailable to secured
creditors who file a financing statement under the name of a corporation's officer, unless the
officer's name is the same as the corporation's exclusive trade name. Id. But see In re Lintz
W. Side Lumber, 655 F.2d 786, 791 (7th Cir. 1981) (financing statement listing John and
Mayella Lintz as debtors was seriously misleading when actual debtor was Lintz West Side
Lumber, Inc.).
94. U.C.C. § 9-402(8).
95. See, eg., In re Firth, 363 F. Supp. 369, 372 (M.D. Ga. 1973); In re Levins, 7 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1076, 1082 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1970); Hobart Corp. v. North Cent.
Credit Serv., Inc., 29 Wash. App. 302, 305-06, 628 P.2d 842, 844-45 (1981).
96. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken (In re Brawn), 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 565, 576 (Bankr. D. Me. 1970).
97. Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Ga. 1979), afl'd, 604 F.2d 669
(5th Cir. 1979); cf In re Brawn, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 565, 576 (Bankr. D. Me.
1970).
98. National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale Supply Co. (In re McBee), 714 F.2d 1316,
1324 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983). At best, the secured party may recover the security only after a
protracted legal dispute.
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procedures. 99
Carelessness becomes an important issue, however, when the se-
cured party's oversight has harmed a third party. Assuming that
the Code requires a thorough investigation, °0 searchers would be
held to whatever information an investigation would have
disclosed.'
When there is a dispute over the filing of a debtor's name, the
court should examine the actual harm caused by the secured party's
error. If the financing statement turns out to be defective, but does
not mislead anyone, invalidation of the secured party's perfection
will needlessly1" 2 defeat the intentions of the parties involved. 10 3
When the third party actually has been misled, denial of perfection
is appropriate since only the secured party could have avoided the
error. 104
4. The Problem of Deceptive Practices
Under the ad hoc approach, the courts are affirming potentially
deceptive practices by validating some financing statements which
only list the debtor's trade name.'0 5 A debtor's trade name can be
changed or dispqsed of at will.'0 6 The per se approach hinders
these deceptive practices since the debtor is unlikely to change his
legal name.
This concern about deceptive practices under the ad hoc view
can be allayed through the use of the Code's good faith require-
ment.10 7 If the secured party fails to make a reasonable inquiry to
discover the debtor's various trade names, his good faith should be
questioned. It is not unjust to compel the same level of inquiry
from the secured party, who can prevent a misleading situation, as
99. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 72, § 23.16, at 958.
100. The ad hoc view suggests this result. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
101. See Farns Assocs. v. South Side Bank, 93 Ill. App. 3d 766, 772, 417 N.E.2d 818, 823
(1981).
102. But see In re Lintz W. Side Lumber, 655 F.2d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 1981) (bankruptcy
trustee, a hypothetical creditor, prejudiced by seriously misleading financing statement).
103. "If under any principle of law or equity the validity of the security can be main-
tained it should be done to effectuate the will of the parties where third parties are not
prejudiced." In re Landolina, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 76, 78-79 (D. Conn. 1967).
104. Note, supra note 82, at 156. Of course, when the error is deliberate, perfection
should always be denied. Good faith is a threshold requirement. U.C.C. § 1-203. See In re
Lintz W. Side Lumber, 655 F.2d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 1981).
105. See Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.) 642 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1981).
106. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. A number of states require fictitious
names to be registered. See generally NATIONAL ASS'N OF CREDIT MANAGEMENT, CREDIT
MANUAL OF COMMERCIAL LAWS, 1984, at 519-33 (1984).
107. See discussion about good faith supra note 104.
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is required of the 'subsecuent searcher attempting to discover prior
security interests.
In sum, several basic policy arguments support a per se require-
ment that the debtor's legal name must be listed in the financing
statement. A per se rule would enhance uniformity, 11 8 and would
avoid unduly burdening searchers.' 9 Without a per se rule, the
Code's few formal requirements might be abolished,110 and decep-
tive use of trade names might be encouraged."' A "flexible" ap-
proach, discussed in the next section, can be adjusted to meet these
same policy goals and provides a viable alternative to the per se
approach.
II. THE FLEXIBLE APPROACH
Another judicial approach for dealing with incorrect filing of
debtor names emerged in National Bank v. West Texas Wholesale
Supply Co. (In re McBee)." 2 There the court validated a financing
statement that listed a trade name which was materially different
from the debtor's legal name.
A. In re McBee
An understanding of the McBee facts is essential to a discussion
of the court's analysis. In January, 1979, Cynthia McBee applied
for a loan from the National Bank of Texas, claiming to be a part-
ner in the Oak Hill Gun Shop.' 3 The bank apparently took her at
her word, gave her a loan secured by the gun shop's present and
future inventory, 1 4 and filed a financing statement listing "Oak Hill
Gun Shop" as the debtor. 5 McBee, however, was never a partner
in the shop;" 6 Joe Ben Colley was its sole proprietor until May,
1980, when he sold it to McBee." 7 Several days before the sale to
McBee, West Texas Wholesale Supply Company sold goods to the
gun shop on credit, which also was secured by the gun shop's inven-
tory.118 The financing statement listed "Joe Ben Colley d/b/a Oak
108. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
112. 714 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. 714 F.2d at 1318.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Hill Gun Shop" as debtor.'19 To complicate matters further, Mc-
Bee obtained a loan from RepublicBank in July, 1980, secured by
the same collateral.' 20 The financing statement listed "C.K. McBee
dba Oak Hill Gun Shop" as the debtor. 12 1
The court validated the financing statement for the first loan, 1 22
which listed "Oak Hill Gun Shop" as the debtor, even though the
debtor's legal name was Joe Ben Colley. Since the two names were
completely dissimilar, the ad hoc approach was unavailable to the
court.12 3 The court looked to Glasco as a starting point, 124 but cre-
ated a flexible approach by imposing additional restrictions.
125
B. Coverage Restricted to Business Loans
The flexible approach is not available when the competing se-
curity interests involve both business and personal creditors. 126 Mc-
Bee was unusual in that all secured creditors were business
creditors; 127 in most cases, both personal and business creditors will
be attempting to reach the debtor's assets. In the latter case, a fi-
nancing statement that lists the trade name of a debtor will be inval-
idated under the flexible approach 12 since
a single debtor is necessarily held out to the credit community
under two names, that of the individual and that of the business.
The individual's credit for personal needs is unrelated to busi-
ness. A personal creditor would not necessarily be aware of the
business or trade name, and thus may not discover the security
interests filed solely under the business name. 129
C. Providing Best Notice to Creditors
While the flexible approach only applies to business loans, it
does allow a liberal, but reasoned interpretation of the debtor's
name requirement. The McBee court acknowledged that trade
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1325.
123. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
126. See In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1324 n.6. "This is not the case of a personal loan;
there a creditor might not reasonably be expected to know or search under a business name."
Id.
127. See id. at 1318.
128. See id. at 1324 n.6.
129. Id. (quoting Brushwood v. Citizens Bank (In re Glasco, Inc.), 642 F.2d 793, 796
(5th Cir. 1981)).
[Vol. 35:j51
TRADE NAME FILING
name filings could be misleading,13 but believed that the Code's
principle of providing notice to third parties could be satisfied with-
out prohibiting those filings as suggested in Comment 7.131 The
court examined the three possibilities available to National Bank,
the first secured party, and concluded that a filing under "Oak Hill
Gun Shop" provided "equal, if not superior, notice of prior security
interests."1
3 2
This reasoning indicates the court's awareness of the Code's at-
tempt to minimize the invalidation of security interests due to rigid
technicalities.13 3  The court seems to have said that the require-
ments of section 9-402 can be met in alternative ways, provided that
each way is consistent with the Code's underlying purpose to im-
pose only minimal formalities for filing a financing statement.13
4
Since section 9-402 seems to create simply a sufficiency, not a suffi-
ciency and necessity test, the court's rationale was reasonable. The
court declared that it would accept erroneous filing statements only
where mistakes could be reconciled with the Code's overall
purposes.
35
1. How Prudent Should a Reasonable Creditor Be?
The McBee court indicated that creditors who wish to make
loans to businesses must make additional inquiries beyond the
debtor's legal name. It said that a "reasonably prudent creditor"
should have searched the debtor's business name 136 since the loan
was for business purposes and secured by business assets.3 7 The
gun shop inventory would or should have suggested a search under
the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop."'138
130. In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1321.
131. Id. at 1323.
132. The three possible names, according to the court were:
1. Joe Ben Colley: would not give notice to creditors of McBee;
2. Cynthia McBee: would fail to accurately reflect the gun shop's true ownership;
3. Oak Hill Gun Shop: the only name with a nexus between the owners.
Id. at 1323-24.
133. See id. at 1324.
134. But see supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (Code's minimal requirements
must be met).
135. The court recognized that its holding was an exception to the general rule which
would invalidate a financing statement that gave the trade name instead of the debtor's legal
name. 714 F.2d at 1321.
136. 714 F.2d at 1324.
137. Id.
138. Id. The decision in a similar case is distinguishable from In re McBee. Goger v.
United States (In re Eady), 4 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979), a tavern owned by Julian
Eady was being used as collateral under a financing statement listing "Janmar, Inc." as the
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The court argued that the last creditor in the case, Repub-
licBank, had this duty of additional inquiry. Since McBee had only
recently become the owner of the Oak Hill Gun Shop"3 9 the bank
should have realized that there might have been prior security inter-
ests in the business collateral."4 Because the Bank would not nec-
essarily know whether the prior owner was an individual, a
partnership, or a corporation, it should have searched under all pos-
sible names, including the trade name.
The court held that this argument did not apply to the second
creditor, Wholesale Supply. Wholesale gave credit to Joe Ben Col-
ley while he owned the gun shop.'41 It could contend that a search
in the records under "Oak Hill Gun Shop" would be burdensome
since it already knew the business was owned by a sole proprietor.
In some instances, a "reasonably prudent creditor" test appro-
priately demands a search beyond the debtor's legal name. If a
creditor, due to a course of previous dealings, is completely aware
of the debtor's trade name, he cannot claim that a financing state-
ment listing the trade name misled him. 42 This test amounts to an
extension of the Code's good faith provision143 and applies only to
debtor. Id. at 2. Jannar, Inc. never owned the tavern, but Julian Eady was an officer of
Janmar, Inc. Id. at 2-3. A creditor stood a greater chance of being misled in this situation,
since he would logically search for the debtor's legal name, or possibly the name of the tav-
ern, but not for "Janmar, Inc." Id. at 1, 3.
139. In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1318.
140. Id. at 1324.
141. Id. at 1318.
142. See Records & Tapes, Inc. v. Argus, 8 Kan. App. 2d 255, 655 P.2d 133 (1982)
(debtor name filed under trade name found valid; debtor's legal name was "Argus, Inc.,"
debtor's trade name was "Argus Tapes and Records"). The court commented:
If plaintiff had searched the record, it could not reasonably have been misled,
and plaintiff does not claim it searched the record and was misled. The thrust of
plaintiff's argument is that since Lieberman did not precisely list the debtor's exact
legal name, Lieberman had not perfected its lien and therefore plaintiff has priority.
This is an oversimplification of the entire thrust of the UCC, and we cannot agree.
8 Kan. App. 2d at 257, 655 P.2d at 134.
143. By defining "good faith" to include reasonable attempts to ascertain the debtor's
legal name, the flexible approach may expand the concept of good faith beyond the UCC
definition. Under McBee, a secured party would be required to show that the debtor's trade
name was consistently used, well-known in the community, and that reasonable efforts to
learn the debtor's legal name proved fruitless. In re McBee, 714 F.2d at 1324 n.8. Courts
probably would be reluctant to extend the definition of good faith this far, unless the circum-
stances should have warned the secured party that the debtor was using a trade name.
In a different context, willful ignorance has precluded the finding of good faith necessary
to become a holder in due course under U.C.C. § 3-302. See General Investment Corp. v.
Angelini, 38 N.J. 396, 403-05, 278 A.2d 193, 196-97 (1971) (given circumstances of case,
failure to inquire amounted to willful ignorance and lack of good faith). See also Burnett v.
H.O.V. Corp. (In re Kalamazoo Steel Process), 503 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1974) (when
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creditors aware of the debtor's trade name. 144
2. How Particular Should a Trade Name Be?
The McBee court implicitly addressed the criticism that trade
names are highly susceptible to change and are therefore mislead-
ing. The court determined that filing under any trade name that
was "consistently used and well known to creditors" would not be
seriously misleading to third parties. 145
Under this test, a potential creditor who is searching for the
name of a debtor with two trade names might be protected, even if
he failed to discover both names. For example, the debtor in
Platt14 6 used two trade names.1 47 Yet the court found that one of
the names, which was similar to the debtor's legal name, gave suffi-
cient notice to the searcher to make additional inquiry.1 48  This
might not be the case under McBee's flexible approach. Unless both
of the debtor's trade names were "consistently used and well
known" they would be seriously misleading. Thus, the variety of
trade names used by the debtor will be an important factor in deter-
mining whether a financing statement which only lists one of those
names is misleading. 149
The "consistently used and well known" test has an inherent
difficulty: when does a trade name become "consistently used"? In
McBee, the two debtors used the name "Oak Hill Gun Shop" for
less than two years. While the court found this time period suffi-
cient, other courts have rejected far longer time periods. In Carter
secured party knows that debtor intends to change names, Code's good faith requirement
compels secured party to ensure that financing statement reflects both names).
144. A separate criticism of the reasonably prudent creditor test is articulated in North-
ern Commercial Corp. v. Friedman (In re Leichter), 471 F.2d 785, 787 (2d Cir. 1982):
[Tihe trustee in bankruptcy must be deemed to stand in the shoes of the most fa-
vored creditor, not simply one who could - by virtue of his dealings with the
debtor acting under his trade name - be held to a semblance of knowledge of the
true facts; even such a creditor, knowing how U.C.C. § 9-402 reads, might never
search the filings under the trade name.
The McBee court indicated that since the financing statement was not seriously misleading, it
was effective against the trustee in bankruptcy. 714 F.2d at 1325.
145. 714 F.2d at 1325.
146. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
147. 257 F. Supp. at 482.
148. Id.
149. See, eg., Citizens Bank v. Ansley, 467 F. Supp. 51 (debtor used a number of names,
never was a farmer even though financing statement showed "Ansley Farms"), afid, 604
F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Moore, 21 Bankr. 898, 899 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (debtor
used between five and seven trade names).
150. 714 F.2d at 1318-19.
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v. Greene County Bank (In re Wilhoit),151 the court refused to insti-
tute the "consistently used" gloss even though the debtor's business,
located in a small community, had gone under the same trade name
for twelve years.1 52 Thus, in the absence of any guidance, courts'
rulings under the test may be contradictory and arbitrary.
D. Should the Flexible Approach Survive?
The value of the "flexible" approach should be assessed in light
of which party should bear the inquiry burden. Should the original
creditor be required to ascertain the debtor's legal name or should
subsequent creditors be expected to search for anything which the
circumstances surrounding the name suggest?
Arguably, the original creditor is in the best position to discover
the debtor's legal name before he extends any credit. If that credi-
tor fails to file correctly, he automatically loses his security interest.
Conversely, the flexible approach could be tolerated if courts
were willing to restrict its use to situations in which third parties are
not unduly burdened, but rather should have been aware of the
trade name. 15
3
Assuming the flexible approach should be abolished, the lan-
guage in section 9-402 must be amended to require the debtors'
legal name in the financing statement explicitly. 154 The nonuniform
Alabama amendment represents a step in this direction.5
Other alternatives should be considered as well. One commen-
tator has suggested a system that indexes the financing statement
under the debtor's social security number for individuals or em-
ployee identification number for businesses.1 56 This proposal would
guarantee zero margin error; to allow any variation in the digits of
the number would open the floodgates of abuse.
Moreover, the growth of computerized indexing suggests the
need to reevaluate the application of the Code's minor errors provi-
sion to incorrect filing of the debtor's legal name. Since the com-
puterization of the index prevents subsequent creditors from
searching for alternative but similar names, minor errors in thp
151. 6 Bankr. 574 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
152. The court followed a per se analysis and decided that, despite the long use of the
trade name, it was not the debtor's legal name. This finding invalidated the financing state-
ment. 6 Bankr. at 575.
153. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
156. IA P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 6C.05[2], at 6C-54.
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debtor's legal name will never become apparent to the subsequent
creditor. 157 The minor errors provision could be amended to hold
original creditors to an absolute duty to insure that the debtor's
legal name is correct or risk losing their security interest. Minor
errors by the original creditor could still be allowed in other ele-
ments of the financing statement.
III. CONCLUSION
As a caveat to creditors entering secured transactions, a noted
commentator warned of the traps one could encounter in bank-
ruptcy proceedings: "The lesson derived from the history of chattel
security and bankruptcy laws is that if a statute can be interpreted
in such a way as to defeat the secured party, it may very well be so
interpreted." '58 Perhaps then the willingness of the court in McBee
to read section 9-402 to protect secured parties represents an overall
softening of attitudes toward security interests.
At some point, however, a secured party's laxity may encroach
on the right of subsequent creditors to adequate notice of prior ex-
isting security interests. Arguably, the flexible approach marks this
point, since the financing statement in McBee gave a name com-
pletely different from the debtor's legal name. The flexible ap-
proach should not apply unless the court is positive that all
creditors were aware of the debtor's trade name and would natu-
rally have searched for it.
Finally, the adoption of a flexible approach may signal a time
for reassessing the respective burdens of creditors and third parties.
Is it asking too much of secured parties, in order to preserve their
security interests, to get one thing right?
LAWRENCE BACH
157. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
158. See I P. COOGAN & W. HOGAN, supra note 8, § 1.04[5], at 1-20.
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